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Abstract
The Conservative Peoples’ Party of Estonia (EKRE) presents a unique case in the 
study of far-right parties for two reasons. First, the ‘others’ to which they juxtapose 
Estonians are the Russian-speaking minority, who are white, Christian, and to a large 
extent, share many of the socially conservative values of the EKRE. Second, there has 
been a trend for European far-right parties to look towards the Russian Federation 
for ideological support due to shared socially conservative ideological positions, and 
an opposition to the EU and NATO. EKRE takes a different stance towards the Russian 
Federation than many other far-right parties in Europe. Interviews were conducted 
with members of EKRE, as well as members of other political parties in Estonia, 
primarily focusing on the post-migrant crisis relationship between EKRE and the 
Russian-speaking population in Estonia, as well as other core issues related to EKRE. 
The aim of this article is twofold: first, it serves as an introductory piece, introducing 
EKRE to the broader literature on populist, radical right parties. Secondly, this article 
asks the questions “is the presence, or the possibility of the presence of a foreign, 
racially and religiously different ‘other’ enough to attract a significant portion of 
a national minority to vote for and become members of a PRR party?” and “is the 
presence, or the possibility of the presence of a foreign, racially and religiously 
different ‘other’ enough to entice a PRR party to cooperate with a national minority 
which was previously their target?” This article argues that EKRE is open to Russian-
speakers becoming members within the party, but will not extend their reach to them 
as Russian speakers. Rather, they would welcome Russian-speakers as party members 
provided they are Estonian nationalists who adhere to the party constitution and see 
Estonia as a sovereign nation which they seek to protect.
Keywords: Estonia; The Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE); populist 
radical right parties; national minorities; nationalism; Russian-speakers; Baltic 
politics; Intermarium; The New Nationalism; Ethnofuturism 
Introduction 
This article is one of the first to present an English language analysis 
of the Estonian party, Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (The Conservative 
People’s Party of Estonia – henceforth, EKRE) in light of their election 
to the Estonian Parliament in 2015. EKRE presents a unique case study 
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for nationalist and populist radical right political (PRR) parties for two 
reasons. First, the “other” to which they have initially juxtaposed ethnic 
Estonians is the Russian-speaking minority, who are white, Christian and, 
to a large extent, share many of the socially conservative values of EKRE. 
Second, there has been a trend within the PRR to establish relationships 
with the Russian Federation due to shared socially conservative ideological 
positions, and a critical approach, to the EU and NATO. While EKRE can 
be placed within the same party family as many PRR parties, they take an 
unfavourable stance towards the Russian Federation. The purpose of this 
article is twofold: first, it contributes to thus far limited English language 
academic scholarship on EKRE after they entered the Estonian parliament 
in 2015. Secondly, this article aims to analyse the potentially changing 
relationship between the EKRE and Estonia’s Russian-speaking community 
in light of the refugee crisis. 
This article provides an analysis of EKRE by analysing interviews 
conducted with party members, as well as members of other Estonian 
parties who provide useful commentary. The interviews analyse EKRE’s 
views towards the European Union after the migrant crisis, the party’s 
potentially changing relationship with the Russian-speaking population 
in Estonia and their stance towards the Russian Federation. This article 
poses two questions. First, “is the presence, or the possibility of the 
presence of a foreign, racially and religiously different “other” enough to 
attract a significant portion of a national minority to vote for and become 
members of a PRR party?” Second, “is the presence, or the possibility of 
the presence of a foreign, racially and religiously different “other” enough 
to entice a PRR party to cooperate with a national minority which was 
previously their target?” 
This article argues both that EKRE is open to Russian-speakers becoming 
active members of the party, but will not extend their reach to them as 
Russian speakers, rather as Estonian nationalists and, secondly, that more 
Russian-speaking Estonians have shown an interest in becoming involved 
in EKRE. Both of which are a direct result of the refugee crisis. Prior to this 
development, EKRE has taken an anti-Russian stance and in some ways still 
does. Further, Russian-speakers in Estonia overwhelmingly support Eesti 
Keskerakond (Estonian Centre Party – henceforth, the Centre Party). 
Background of EKRE 
Estonia is new to the almost unanimous list of European countries 
with a PRR party represented in Parliament. For many years, Estonia lacked 
a successful right-wing, nationalist party (Auers and Kasekamp 2015). One 
of the primary reasons for the lack of a successful far-right party was the 
absence of a prominent and charismatic leader (Auers and Kasekamp 2013). 
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This aspect is no longer missing. Father and son, Mart and Martin Helme, 
successfully moulded EKRE out of a merger between Eestimaa Rahvaliit 
(the People’s Union of Estonia) and Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine (The Estonian 
National Movement) in 2012. This merger was a marriage of a political 
party and a social movement. 
Aside from the Russian-speaking population, there are relatively 
few ethnically different inhabitants in Estonia. Therefore, memory 
politics has been, up until now, the primary agent for the Estonian far-
right in the 21st century (Auers and Kasekamp 2013) and the Russian-
speaking population has been the group to which Estonian nationalists 
have identified themselves against. EKRE first gained parliamentary 
representation in 2015, securing seven, out of a possible 101 seats 
in the Estonian Parliament. This is relatively late considering that all of 
Estonia’s neighbours have a successful PRR party. There have been several 
attempts to label and categorise parties who are nationalist, conservative, 
opposed to immigration and hold a critical, if not hostile, view towards 
the European Union. The common aspect that unites these parties is 
maintaining a nativist stance by combining nationalist and xenophobic 
attitudes (De Lange and Mügge 2015; Harteveld et al 2015; Mudde 2007). 
Cas Mudde (2007) coined the authoritative term in academic literature, 
populist radical right (PRR), to label parties in this family. This article will 
define a PRR party as a party that takes a strong nativist stance, vocalising 
an exclusionary attitude towards immigration and multiculturalism, as 
well as utilising the tactic of juxtaposing political elites to everyone else 
in an attempt to appeal to whom they deem as ‘ordinary citizens’. Using 
Mudde’s (2007) categorisation, this article firmly places EKRE within this 
party family. 
Auers and Kasekamp (2013) note, that there is a distinct brand of right-
wing politics in post-Soviet Baltic States, which directs nativism towards 
the Russian-speaking population who arrived during the Soviet occupation 
(Auers and Kasekamp 2013). Bustokova and Kitschelt (2009) allude to 
a significant difference which sets the PRR in post-communist countries 
apart from the PRR in Western Europe, namely, that the “other” constitutes 
ethnic groups who have been inhabiting the region for centuries, even 
prior to the Soviet period. In the case of Estonia, this has not been 
centuries, but decades as the Russian-speaking minority arrived during 
Soviet occupation. 
Further, Minkenberg (2002) makes two important and unique 
observations about the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. 
First, that parties in these countries share similar characteristics which 
differentiate them from the PRR in Western Europe. Namely, that they 
are ideologically more extreme, more anti-democratic and that they are 
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more of a social movement phenomenon (Minkenberg 2002 & 2013).1 
Minkenberg indicates that the new radical right has softened its approach 
to anti-democratic rhetoric (ibid), yet it should be noted that EKRE 
does not espouse anti-democratic rhetoric. Second, Minkenberg (2002) 
recognises, that the PRR in Central and Eastern Europe is a fluid concept, 
constantly evolving and likens studying this phenomenon to shooting at 
a moving target with clouded vision (Minkenberg 2002). The PRR parties in 
Central and Eastern Europe to which EKRE has the most in common with 
is the Latvian National Alliance.2 There has not been an anti-democratic 
attitude prevalent within EKRE and, although a grassroots mobilising 
force has played a part in the party’s history, there is no militant wing of 
the party similar to the Magyar Gàrda affiliated with Jobbik or the Slovak 
Brotherhood affiliated with Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia.3 
EKRE and Europe
The presence of a pro-democratic ethos is particularly evident in the 
party’s favourable stance towards Swiss style direct democracy. This can 
be seen most adequately in their attitude towards the European Union. 
Vasilopoulou (2009) points out that Euroscepticism is not a monolithic 
entity and identifies three types of Euroscepticism: rejecting, conditional, 
and compromising. This article places EKRE between the conditional 
and rejecting categories Euroscepticism. EKRE does not directly advocate 
for Estonia leaving the EU, rather, they would like to let the Estonian 
people decide if Estonia should remain in the union. In April of 2017 at 
the party conference, where Chairman Mart Helme was re-elected by an 
overwhelming majority, the congress called for Estonian citizens to have 
a say on their country’s membership in the EU (Cavegn, 2017). Sovereignty 
is the primary issue that EKRE takes with the EU, especially when it comes 
to the migrant crisis, security related issues, and non-Estonians in Estonia.4 
 1 Minkenberg (2002) notes an important difference between political parties and social 
movements. Whereas parties participate in elections and try to win public office, 
social movements mobilise support, but do not run for public office. Instead, social 
movements identify with a network of networks which have a well-defined collective 
identity and offer interpretative frames for problems. 
 2 It should be noted that the two parties which EKRE has the closest relationship with 
are the National Alliance and the True Finns, thus putting them in a sphere of influence 
between Nordic and Eastern Europe, another factor which makes them a unique case. 
 3 Although the European-wide street patrol group Soldiers of Odin exists in Estonia, it 
is a separate organisation from EKRE. There is, however, some convergence as recently 
members of Soldiers of Odin marched alongside EKRE and other nationalist and far-
right actors in the annual torchlight parade on Estonia’s Independence Day. 
 4 Interview with Martin Helme and Interview with Jaak Madison. 
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The congress, in its call for the Estonian people to reassess EU membership, 
has called for the preservation of ‘Estonianness’ and for the guarantee of 
well-being for Estonia’s indigenous population (Cavegn, 2017). 
In interviews with key EKRE members, it was stressed that the EU has 
changed since 2004 when Estonia joined. EKRE MP and deputy chairman 
of the European Union Affairs Committee, Jaak Madison, stated in an 
interview that the EU is one of the most undemocratic systems, citing 
penalties for not accepting EU mandates and rules.5 At the same time, 
Madison revealed that neither he, nor the party had ever said that they 
wished to leave the EU, though they did applaud Brexit.6 What Madison 
did discuss is the issues behind why other countries have had parties 
that brought exiting the EU to the agenda. According to him, if the EU 
continues towards a path of creating a federation, citizens will be highly 
critical of this. Madison, while confirming that neither he nor EKRE wished 
for an Estonian exit, stressed that if there was a Brexit style vote in Estonia, 
the main question would be the migration crisis to which the majority of 
Estonians are opposed to.7 
EKRE Deputy Chairman, Martin Helme, stressed the issue of sovereignty. 
According to Helme, a large part of Estonian society along with EKRE do 
not accept the quota system or the mandatory placement of migrants 
into Estonian society.8 Helme discussed the failure of both the EU and the 
Estonian government with regards to this issue. According to Helme, an EU 
external border does not exist and EKRE strongly advocates for restoring 
Estonian border control.9 He blames the Estonian government for not 
defending Estonian interests in Brussels and applauds Austria and the 
Visegrád countries for strongly defending their position and their borders 
against mandates from Brussels.10 It is this perceived failure which Helme 
feels has turned many Estonians against the EU.11 
A devil you don’t want to dance with
Another aspect of EKRE that differentiates them from a number of 
parties within the PRR party family is their position towards the Russian 
 5 Interview with Jaak Madison. 
 6 Interview with Jaak Madison. 
 7 Interview with Jaak Madison. Though it was also mentioned in this interview that, 
although many in Estonia were critical or against Estonia accepting refugees, not all 
who held this view voted for EKRE. 
 8 Interview with Martin Helme.
 9 Interview with Martin Helme.
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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Federation. Many PRR parties, agitated with the European Union, have 
turned their ideological gaze eastward. It has been a growing trend for 
European PRR parties to openly support Russian President Vladimir Putin. 
The Hungarian think tank, Political Capital Institute, has labelled three 
types of PRR parties vis-à-vis their stance towards the Russian Federation: 
committed, open/neutral, and hostile (Political Capital Institute, 2014). 
Most PRR parties fall under the committed category, while some fall under 
open and neutral. The smallest category is hostile. Although they are 
not mentioned in this study, the author places the EKRE in the hostile 
category. EKRE has not identified any willingness to cooperate with or 
show support for Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation. Martin Helme 
acknowledged that there has been some interest in the Russian Federation 
shown by PRR parties in Western Europe and expressed that EKRE is “very, 
very mindful of the fact that there has been some naivety and cynicism 
on the part of western anti-immigrant parties toward Russia” and that he 
has explained to them that this is “a devil that you don’t want to dance 
with.”12 Helme alludes to the fact that countries such as France and the 
Netherlands do not have the same historic experience with the Russian 
Federation as Estonia.13
Helme believes the Russian Federation is manipulating the existential 
crisis that Europe is experiencing with mass migration to their benefit 
in an attempt to sow discord with the end goal of restoring the Russian 
Empire.14 If discourses from the majority of other PRR parties in Europe 
are analysed, this is the exact opposite of the narrative. There has been 
some speculation that EKRE has been covertly flirting with Russia and 
rumours about financing have been discussed.15 Martin Helme is aware of 
such rumours and mentioned that EKRE has been accused of doing Putin’s 
dirty work because indeed, there are several political positions which 
EKRE has in common with Vladimir Putin.16 Helme also mentioned that 
it is common knowledge that no one can present any evidence that EKRE 
has collaborated with the Russian Federation so people have “given up.”17 
Given the political positions that EKRE has taken and the fact that they 
actively try to persuade other PRR parties not to align themselves with 
12 Interview with Martin Helme. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Interview with Martin Helme. 
15 Interview with Valdo Randpere. 
16 Interview with Martin Helme. 
17 Interview with Martin Helme. 
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the Russian Federation18, it is highly unlikely that they secretly sympathise 
with Putin. 
Blue Awakening, Ethnofuturism and transnational alliances 
Ruuben Kaalep, chairman and founder of EKRE’s youth organisation, 
Sinine Äratus (Blue Awakening), advocates for a closer union between Baltic 
and Eastern European countries. Kaalep noted an increasing divide in 
ideology between Western and Eastern European countries and cited the 
migrant crisis as the primary indicator of such a phenomenon.19 As was 
pointed out by Minkenberg (2002 & 2013), Auers and Kasekamp (2015), 
and Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009), the PRR in post-communist countries 
differ ideologically from their western counterparts. According to Kaalep, 
in Eastern Europe the presence of Soviet history has “vaccinated Eastern 
Europeans against leftist ideology.”20 The second issue that differentiates 
Eastern Europe, according to Kaalep, is that national identity is much more 
alive in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.21
Although a youth organisation, the ideology and discourse of Blue 
Awakening is especially important, because, as the future of the EKRE, 
their young members will likely be the next generation who hold elected 
office for this party. Blue Awakening is very active in recruiting members 
for EKRE, maintaining an online presence and fostering transnational 
connections with other nationalists. Therefore, their ideas and positions 
should be taken into account in an assessment of the party. Fielitz and 
Laloire (2016) point out that the European far-right is currently undergoing 
a process of restructuring where new actors have appeared and successfully 
gained influence in the political sphere. These new actors draw on new 
forms of mobilisation and transnational networking, incorporating certain 
aspects which have been previously absent in the far right (Fielitz and 
Laloire, 2016). 
The discourse from Blue Awakening hints to potential new alliances 
among nationalists from Eastern Europe. Ruuben Kaalep and fellow Blue 
Awakening member, Kert Urmas Raudvere, spoke of EKRE’s close alignment 
with the youth wing of the Latvian National Alliance (NA). Overall, the 
NA is the closest party to which EKRE is allied in terms of collaboration 
and networks, but the party also has ties with the True Finns and the 
18 Interviews with Ruuben Kaalep and Kert Urmas Raudvere. 
19 Interview with Ruuben Kaalep. 
20 Interview with Ruuben Kaalep.
21 Ibid.
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Freedom Party of Austria, two very successful PRR parties.22 Two fairly 
recent developments in the form of transnational networks are the Bauska 
Declaration and Intermarium. 
The former is part of a Baltic-wide alliance of nationalists, which align 
under their proclaimed Bauska Declaration.23 This consists of the Latvian 
National Alliance, the Lithuanian Nationalist Union, and EKRE. This alliance 
goes beyond the youth movements as the two EKRE signatories were party 
Chairman Mart Helme along with Ruuben Kaalep. The declaration calls for 
the maintaining of family values and the fatherland and cautions against 
an immigration policy like that of Western Europe.24 The declaration also 
calls for a new nationalist awakening and encourages cooperation between 
the three Baltic nations to defend against external threats and global 
challenges.25 
Further, Blue Awakening maintains very close alliances with Polish, 
Slovak, Ukrainian and Hungarian nationalists26 as well as the alt-right. It is 
their goal to foster alliances with as many other nationalists as possible. 
Blue Awakening members Ruuben Kaalep and Kert Urmas Raudvere 
discussed a counterbalance to both Western European influence and 
Russian imperialist ambitions in the form of a large Eastern European 
nationalist block. Both cited an alternative to the Europe envisioned by 
Brussels in the form of an Eastern European block that would serve as an 
ideological alternative to the liberal values promoted by Brussels.27 
As several PRR parties view Vladimir Putin’s Russia as a nationalist 
and conservative alternative to what the Brussels elite have offered, the 
Intermarium strategy is part of a nationalist movement to provide an 
ideological substitute to both the EU and the tendency to look towards the 
Putin’s Russia as a viable political alternative. Kert Urmas Raudvere stressed 
that this would not be against Western Europe per se, only ideologically 
different – more right-wing, more conservative and more nationalist.28 
Intermarium, named after the historical interwar plan, is a strategy 
promoted by the nationalist group, ‘The New Nationalism’, which ‘links 
the far right from the Baltic to the Black sea.’29 This network consists of 
nationalists mostly from youth organisations of PRR parties throughout 
22 Interview with Jaak Madison.
23 Bauska Deklaratsioon. https://ekre.ee/bauska-deklaratsioon/ 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Interview with Kert Urmas Raudvere. 
27 Interview with Ruuben Kaalep and Interview with Kert Urmas Raudvere. 
28 Interview with Kert Urmas Raudvere. 
29 The New Nationalism. http://thenewnationalism.com/ 
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Eastern Europe and Swedish nationalists.30 As the Visegrád countries have 
been somewhat defiant towards Brussels in light of the refugee crisis and 
the nationalist, far-right is empowered in all of these countries with the 
exception of the Czech Republic, this would be a notable political shift.31 
While this is largely a youth movement, the likelihood of many of the youth 
members eventually holding elected office is quite probable. In Latvia, the 
National Alliance is in government and has become a normalised part of 
the Latvian political system. In Hungary, Jobbik is the third largest political 
party and Slovakia has two PRR parties in Parliament. EKRE does not wield 
as much power as the aforementioned parties, but is influential in both 
Estonian politics and the Intermarium ideology as one of the driving forces 
behind the project. 
The philosophy behind intermarium, known as ‘ethnofuturism’, is part 
of a new nationalist approach driven by Ruuben Kaalep and Raivis Zeltīts, 
the secretary general of the Latvian National Alliance and head of their 
youth organisation. Ethnofuturism is a nationalist doctrine intended to 
create a new European civilization based upon identity and roots and led 
by Eastern Europe (London Forum, 2017).32 The driving principle behind 
this is that Eastern Europe is caught between two major global spheres 
of interest: The U.S. and the Russian Federation (ibid). The concept of 
ethnofuturism is based on identities and stands against imperialism which 
is seen as a force detrimental to identity based nationalism. 
Bringing about the destruction of both American and Russian 
imperialism and replacing them with white ethnostates is a goal of 
ethno futurism (Red Ice TV, 2017).33 This philosophy stresses cooperation 
between nationalists. However, given the historic and contemporary 
experiences of the nationalities in the region, getting nationalists from 
diverse Eastern European backgrounds to cooperate with each other 
could prove to be challenging. Kaalep emphasises that the mission of all 
European nationalists should be to cooperate to save Europe; once this 
30 It should be noted that the Swedish organisation that Blue Awakening has the most 
contact with is Nordisk Ungdom, a far-right, extra parliamentary group. 
31 Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland is by most accounts, a right-wing, national-conservative 
party. However, after they came to power in 2015, during the heat of the refugee crisis, 
I consider PiS to be a radical right actor. See, “The Polish Boomerang: How Warsaw’s 
Adaption of the ‘Budapest Model’ Could Threaten the Original in Hungary.” By Cas 
Mudde, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cas-mudde/the-polish-boomerang-how-
_b_8961896.html. 
32 London Forum: Ruuben Kaalep – “The Principles of Ethnofuturism.” https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=JMcAsYsioqA 
33 Red Ice TV: Ruuben Kaalep – Blue Awakening: Estonian Nationalism – Identitarian Ideas 
IX. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0AkqRUpoO20 
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is achieved nationalists can return to fighting each other.34 However, 
once Europe is ‘saved’, perhaps there will be no need for further fighting 
amongst European nationalists (ibid). 
So far, this has been successful. On 24 February 2017, commemorating 
Estonian Independence, EKRE hosted the fourth annual torchlight parade. 
Attendance for this event has gone from 120 people to 3500 (Red Ice 
TV, 2017). Not all in attendance were Estonian. Polish, Lithuanian, and 
Ukrainian nationalists – old enemies, were brought together, “marching for 
unity” (ibid). In the case of both Latvia and Estonia, cooperation amongst 
nationalists is of particular importance with regard to the Russian-speaking 
population.
EKRE and Russian-speakers in Estonia 
In neighbouring Latvia, there is strong evidence that the Latvian and 
Russian community have found a common ground on the refugee crisis. 
Namely, that they may not be the closest, but that they have a mutual 
distrust of asylum-seekers (Ragozin, 2015). Muravska (2015) and Ragozin 
(2015) allude to the fact that politicians in Latvia and more than half of the 
population are opposed to taking in refugees. Ragozin (2015) goes so far 
as to say that the two groups in Latvia are “united” on the issue (Ragozin 
2015). Kott (2016) has also found that nationalist leaning ethnic Latvians 
and Russians in Latvia have found a common ground in the discourse 
of ‘endangered whiteness’ stemming from even the idea that people of 
a foreign background might come to Latvia. According to Latvian Foreign 
Minister Edgars Rinkevics, Latvia has the most negative attitude towards 
refugees in the European Union (Muravska 2015). What is telling is that 
in Latvia, Harmony, the political party which caters to Russian speakers, 
helped nationalists to push a law which would stop the government 
from accepting more refugees without first putting the issue to a vote in 
parliament (Ragozin 2015).
Whereas their Latvian counterparts, the National Alliance is part of 
a three-party coalition, EKRE was elected to the Estonian Parliament for 
the first time in March of 2015 and is not in government. As a nationalist 
party, the question of whom they define as Estonian might change with 
the arrival, or the potential arrival, of a number of others outside of the 
traditional ethnic make-up of Estonia. Although Estonia has taken a very 
small number of refugees, it should be noted that the concern over 
refugees is not necessarily about the numbers that have been accepted, 
34 Ruuben Kaalep: “The Principles of Ethnofuturism.” 
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but the potential for a massive influx of foreigners into Estonian society. 
This is what EKRE has successfully capitalised on in the past two years. 
It has been stated in several interviews that many Russian-speakers 
are more against Estonia taking refugees than Estonians.35 Centre Party 
MEP, Yana Toom, noted that the refugee crisis is the main issue that unites 
Estonians and Russian-speakers in Estonia.36 Yana Toom also mentioned 
that there were some former Centre Party supporters who had shifted their 
support to EKRE.37 The Estonian Centre Party recently replaced its long-
time, controversial leader, former-Mayor of Tallinn, Edgar Savisaar, after an 
internal power struggle. The new leader, Jüri Ratas, was elected as Centre 
party leader on 5 November 2016. Just weeks later, on 23 November, the 
Centre Party entered government with Ratas as Prime Minister after the 
Reform Party lost a vote of no confidence. Less than one month prior, in 
an interview with the author, Yana Toom predicted that Jüri Ratas would 
likely replace Savisaar as head of the Centre Party and was unsure if “the 
majority of Russian-speakers would like this.”38 Yana Toom also felt that 
there would be more Russian-speakers who would switch their allegiance 
to EKRE in the future.39 Centre Party Member of Parliament, Oudekki 
Loone, did not share this view. She stressed that as long as EKRE stuck 
with the argument that Estonia should be an ethnic state, they would not 
get enough of the Russian vote.40 However, according to Loone, if they 
dropped this, the Centre Party would be in a dangerous position.41 
The EKRE is not opposed to Russian-speaking members joining the 
party. In fact, there has never been any principle that all party members 
should be ethnic Estonians, rather, one must simply be an Estonian 
citizen.42 There has been an increasing number of Russian-speakers who 
have become friendly to Estonian nationalism and who are opposed to 
any new migration and some who have become members, largely due 
to the refugee crisis.43 This is more pronounced in Blue Awakening. Jaak 
Madison even stated that one member of Blue Awakening who was born 
in the Russian Federation and moved to Estonia when she was ten years 
35 Interview with Yana Toom; Interview with Martin Helme; Interview with Urmas Paet; 
Interview with Valdo Randpere; Interview with Jaak Madison. 
36 Interview with Yana Toom. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Interview with Yana Toom. 
39 Ibid.
40 Interview with Oudekki Loone. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Interview with Ruuben Kaalep and Interview with Jaak Madison. 
43 Interview with Ruuben Kaalep.
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old, is one of the “biggest patriots.”44 All of the interviews conducted 
with members of EKRE and with politicians from other political parties 
in Estonia acknowledged the potential for EKRE to attract more Russian-
speakers on the basis of that portion of Estonian society holding slightly 
more conservative values, as well as being more sceptical of Estonia 
accepting migrants.45 
During a speech at the annual American Renaissance conference, 
Ruuben Kaalep was asked a question by a Polish nationalist as to whether 
or not EKRE attempted to reach out to the Russian population in Estonia. 
His answer was that “whenever two white nations together face something 
that is not white, they will see that eventually it is better to work 
together” (American Renaissance, 2016)46. The question to what extent 
is EKRE an ethnic, as opposed to a strictly an Estonian nationalist party 
and would they be accepting of Russian-speaking Estonians as members 
can be answered based on interviews with several key EKRE members. 
The conclusion is reached that EKRE is an Estonian nationalist party and 
would accept Russian-speakers as members provided that they speak 
Estonian and present themselves as Estonian nationalists. The party would 
accept this type of Estonian nationalist, with a Russian background, but 
will not change their campaign literature to the Russian language.47 
Interestingly, there are plans to campaign in areas of Tallinn with large 
numbers of Russian-speaking residents.48 According to Jaak Madison, the 
party plans on approaching Russian-speakers, not as Russian-speakers, but 
as people who support traditional, conservative values and who would be 
receptive to a party that vows to protect Estonia in light of the migrant 
crisis.49 Madison further noted that EKRE will not campaign in these areas 
in Russian, but that they will send Russian-speaking members to campaign 
for EKRE because “if these people are Alexi or Natalia and a member of 
EKRE, then they are not fascists.”50 Thus the party is an ethnic nationalist 
party that wishes to conserve the ethnic makeup of Estonia, but would 
consider Russian-speaking Estonians who speak Estonian and pledge their 
44 Interview with Jaak Madisson. 
45 Interview with Oudekki Loone. Interview with Jaak Madisson; Interview with Valdo 
Randpere; Interview with Yana Toom; Interview with Kert Urmas Raudvere and 
Interview with Urmas Paet. 
46 American Renaissance: Ruuben Kaalep: A call to action from a small white country.” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIRue1635YA&t=304s
47 Interview with Ruuben Kaalep and Interview with Jaak Madison.
48 Interview with Jaak Madison. The Russian-speaking population of Tallinn is near 40% of 
the city’s overall population. 
49 Interview with Jaak Madison. 
50 Ibid. 
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allegiance to Estonia as allies in light of the refugee crisis. The line in the 
sand EKRE has drawn with the country’s minority group becomes linguistic 
with this political development. 
While MPs from other parties are certainly aware of the rise in support 
for EKRE, many feel that this will not drastically alter the political landscape 
of Estonia. According to Reform Party MP, Valdo Randpere, although the 
migrant crisis was an area of great concern in Estonia in the beginning, 
things had calmed down and people were not as alarmed once they 
realised that Estonia would accept only a modest number of refugees.51 
Regardless, EKRE, according to Randpere, “still wants to ride this horse…
which is maybe not dead, but quite tired.”52 Reform MEP, Urmas Paet, 
elaborates further on this issue, pointing out that the issue of refugees has 
been on the political agenda for two years and not much has happened.53 
According to Paet, EKRE will have a limited amount of time to play on 
fears about refugees and migrants arriving in Estonia, if they do not come 
in large numbers, EKRE will need some other elements in their agenda.54 
Therefore, although the party has attracted some Russian-speaking 
members, and is willing to cooperate with other European nationalists, 
they have not sought them out and the refugee crisis alone might not be 
enough to attract Russian-speakers in large enough numbers to drastically 
impact the Estonian political landscape. 
Conclusion 
EKRE presents a unique case within the PRR party family as they are 
not in the position to be overly critical of the EU and NATO, like the 
majority of other PRR parties in Europe, due to their close proximity to 
and historic relationship with the Russian Federation. Further, the fact 
that the largest minority group to which they have previously gained 
popularity by juxtaposing themselves against is white and Christian and, 
therefore a suitable ally in light of the refugee crisis and the new ideology 
of ethnofuturism espoused by some party members. It remains to be seen 
exactly where Russian Estonians fit with EKRE vis-à-vis the ethnofuturism 
discourse. As this project stresses cooperation between ‘white’ nations in 
a time where they are seen to be facing a mutual threat, but also suggests 
that cooperation should not cease once the goals of this project are met, 
this presents an interesting future discourse between the two groups. EKRE 
51 Interview with Valdo Randpere. 
52 Interview with Valdo Randpere. 
53 Interview with Urmas Paet. 
54 Interview with Urmas Paet. 
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mandates that Russian-speaking members present themselves as Estonian 
nationalists and affirms that the party will not campaign or converse in 
Russian. This suggests that language is the decisive factor, not ethnicity. 
The EKRE does not advocate for Estonia to leave the EU, rather, they 
present an alternative vision for European cooperation which is more 
nationalist, conservative and Eastern-focused. They are not one of the 
numerous PRR parties who have a flirtatious relationship with Vladimir 
Putin and rather serve as a counterbalance within the realm of PRR 
politics to the Kremlin’s influence on this party family. There have been 
some Russian-speakers who have joined EKRE as a direct result of the 
refugee crisis. However, the number is not staggering and is not enough to 
drastically alter the political landscape of Estonia yet, though this is a new 
and unlikely alliance. This is in large part because the number of refugees 
that have come to Estonia has been quite modest and will, in all likelihood, 
continue to be. Given that Blue Awakening is heavily promoting the 
concept of ethnofuturism and intermarium, it seems likely that EKRE will 
continue to be open to Russian-speakers who adapt to EKRE’s stipulations 
for membership, though as of yet, they have not sought them out. To 
answer the research questions, in the case of Estonia, it appears that the 
possibility of the influx of a foreign, racially and religiously different ‘other’ 
has begun to change the dynamics of the relationship between a PRR party, 
EKRE, and the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. However, it remains 
to be seen whether a significant amount of Russian-speakers will gravitate 
to EKRE and if having more Russian-speaking members of the party will 
attract others. 
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